Abstract: Traditionally, energy planning has been interpreted as planning for an appropriate energy supply system, based on a crude prognosis for the energy demand. Over the past couple of decades, however, the immense possibilities of regulating energy demand -and the benefits of doing it -have become increasingly recognized and also partly included in the planning. This paper first describes some methods and concepts organized around the energy chain, and used in analysing energy savings options at the end-user. The end-use efficiency is by definition difficult to estimate, and this problem might very well contribute to the lack of success in implementing the savings. Various ways out of evaluating the results are discussed.
Introduction
The advantage and even necessity of including the demand side in energy planning has already, for a decade or two been widely recognized, and has been applied in modelling and planning. Still, however, the demand side has not been taken seriously in government actions, despite its obvious environmental advantages over the much admired supply side. This paper outlines some model strategies to take into account in order to get a full picture of the demand side options, and also points out some of the pitfalls, myths, and flaws around modelling and planning the demand saving options.
The most important elements of energy saving activities involve those end-use links of the energy system, which are stretched out between technology and human needs. Contrary to the supply end of the system chain, where purely technical or physical elements can be modelled quantitatively, the models of energy savings, or demand models, must necessarily involve qualitative aspects of life which cannot easily be expressed in numbers or physical terms, and this should not always be attempted. For this part of the energy system, models have to be interpreted in the broad sense of the word, including descriptive models, mental models, and other non-mathematical models. In the 1970s, energy planning became an academic exercise. From the beginning this planning was dominated by natural scientists who had become engaged in the development of societies and environmental constraints. Their background in hard natural science, with its demand for objectivity, often makes them hesitant to enter the softer and somewhat less objective energy demand side modelling. From an overall scientific point of view, however, the demand side modelling field could break down the walls between the various disciplines and form a range for exercising the much needed interdisciplinary analyses of the relationships between human needs, social structures, technology, etc. From a political, democratic point of view, this type of research should not be left in a vacuum, but rather supported and the scientists encouraged to communicate the results to a broad public audience.
As a basis for this paper, a simple, full energy chain model will first be presented. From that model the various links and their interconnections can be discussed.
Full energy chain model
A model of the whole system chain which converts the physical resources, here primary energy, into welfare, is shown in Figure 1 .
The fulfilling of human needs and wishes, expressed by the term 'welfare', is put at the top, which H. Daly terms the ultimate end [1] . At the bottom, the primary energy resources constitute the ultimate means. In between there are numerous links, which in analogy to Daly's terminology can be termed intermediate means, if seen from the higher level closer to the ultimate ends, or an intermediate end, if viewed as the result of a lower level system in Figure 1 . Three of the links can be identified as sub-systems of the total conversion, namely the lifestyle, the end-use technologies, and the supply technologies. The whole system, as well as each of the sub-systems, can be ascribed to an efficiency, defined as the ratio of the wanted output to the needed input. These efficiencies cannot always be quantified.
While the energy and its derivatives flow from the bottom to the top, the planning process in this model is suggested to start from the top, with the ultimate end, and subsequently move its way down through the intermediate means to the ultimate means, the resources to be extracted from the ecological system. In the following, the various links in the energy chain are briefly defined and described. Figure 1 The energy chain of systems converting the ultimate means, primary energy into energy services, is here extended with the lifestyle system, which turns the services into the ultimate end, here termed welfare.
Welfare
To begin at the top, the ultimate end of our energy systems is termed here energy welfare, or just welfare. This should be interpreted as well-being, quality of life, or whatever terms have been applied to express the ultimate end of satisfying people's real needs and wants. This broad definition simply implies that the ultimate end -what people really want -is welfare. In this model the welfare is provided by what is summarized here under the term 'lifestyles'.
Lifestyles
The system in which people organize society and daily behaviour in an attempt to satisfy their needs is here termed lifestyle, as discussed later in more detail. Household size and pattern, working hours, diets, leisure activities, social life, etc. are examples of lifestyle elements, many of which have implications for the choices of energy services. Lifestyle reflects people's needs and social values, but it is constrained by the frames provided by the natural environment and society [2] .
Energy models and energy planning will usually not explicitly include welfare and lifestyles, but at best include the demand for energy services as an input to a scenario model. However, when creating a background scenario of quantifiable energy services as input to an energy demand model, the lifestyle and hence the non-quantifiable elements of energy welfare are implicitly included, but usually not discussed. Since the output from lifestyle and welfare in general cannot be quantified, the efficiency by which lifestyle system turns energy services into welfare cannot be expressed by numbers either. As compared to the hard facts in the systems discussed below, the issues around the lifestyle system are dominated by soft parameters, which are indicated by the 'bag' shape of the system in Figure 1 .
Energy services
Energy services are important building blocks in forming a lifestyle to provide welfare. The energy service link in the chain will here be defined as the last quantifiable link in the energy chain from primary energy towards welfare, see Figure 1 . Examples of energy services are clean clothes, warm meals, transportation, illuminated rooms, and comfortable indoor climates, which are provided direct to the user by the energy consuming end-use technologies, and hence can be termed direct energy services.
Indirect energy services are embodied in the consumer goods and services we purchase. The manufacturing of these goods involves countless energy services ranging from writing out invoices over tilling the farmer's soil to stain protecting sheetmetal. It can also be suggested that the final products constitute the energy service expressed in numbers of chairs, kg of carrots, or hours of watching theatre plays. Such energy services purchased by the consumers are analysed under the term of indirect energy. Here we will not go into details along this line of indirect or embodied energy, which is dealt with extensively elsewhere [3, 4] .
End-use technologies
The end-use technologies make up the system which converts the secondary energy to energy services. Since the output from the end-use technologies is expressed in physical terms, the efficiency of each single end-use technology like a washing machine or a car can be quantified as kg clothes washed pr kWh energy used or km driven per litre of gasoline. There is substantial potential for improving these efficiencies as described extensively elsewhere [5, 6, 7] . The problems of defining the end-use efficiencies, as well as adding them, are discussed later in this paper.
Secondary energy
The borderline between energy supply and demand in a market economy runs in the sale and purchase of secondary energy, also termed useful energy or energywares. The latter is suggested as an international standard by ISO [8] . Secondary energy refers to the energy which is refined and ready for use by consumers. Examples are electricity, gasoline, charcoal, natural gas, and district heat.
Supply technologies
Although energy supply is not the topic of this paper, we will complete the energy chain with the supply technologies converting primary energy into secondary energy, Figure 1 . Development and investments in energy supply systems have a profound impact on the conditions for energy savings.
Over the past century, efficiency of the electricity supply side has been increasing at a rather steady rate, which has probably contributed to turning attention away from end-use efficiency. A hundred years ago, electricity generation from fossil fuels was performed with an efficiency around 5%. Today it has reached 50% for new plants, and approaching some theoretical limits for thermal production from fuels, which today is the dominant method of electricity in the world. Similarly with heat supply, where the conversion of fuel to heat can now be performed with an efficiency close to 100%. The fact that we can see an end to big gains from efficiency of traditional supply systems could help turn attention towards end-use efficiency.
One supply system, however, still holds significant potential for efficiency improvement, namely the combined production of heat and electricity. For decades this cogeneration has been utilized in a few cities where the heat was used for space heating through district heating grids. Since the oil shock in 1973, cogeneration has been vigorously promoted in Denmark, where today more than 35% of the country's total demand for space heat has been supplied from combined heat and power plants, large as well as small decentralized units [9] . The total efficiency of producing both electricity and heat can reach more than 90%, saving fuel, money and environmental impact. But the allocation of these benefits from cogeneration between the two products, electricity and heat, is a political choice. This has led in Denmark to a tariff policy for district heat, which seems to be based on considering the heat from cogeneration as 'waste heat'. Hence the tariffs tend to encourage high consumption of heat in order to write off the high investments in distribution pipe grids. Heat saving in buildings is discouraged.
In a fuel based electricity generation system, cogeneration presents an obvious advantage, but in a longer time perspective of sustainable supply, ignorance towards saving heat might appear shortsighted for the following reasons. The lifetimes of buildings are in the order of magnitude of 100 years, but within the next few decades the supply of electricity will probably be characterized by:
1 increases in electricity efficiency of the plants, which will leave less 'waste heat', 2 efforts to save electricity which will reduce the overall need to produce electricity and hence to provide 'waste heat', and 3 electricity increasingly being produced by non-fuel, renewable resources in the form of hydropower, windpower, and photovoltaic electricity, none of which gives any 'waste heat'.
But most of the poorly insulated buildings will still be around. An estimated 40% of global end-use of energy is in the form of low temperature heat [10] . Since it is technologically possible and economically feasible essentially to eliminate this consumption, it is time to take heat saving seriously, also in cases like that of cogeneration, where heat temporarily appears to be inexpensive. The above examples from the supply situation illustrate a very basic conflict between market economy and sustainable energy planning. The market economy will dictate an efficient supply system. This implies substantial investments in oil and gas exploitation, in conversion plants, as well as in the transmission and distribution grids for gas, electricity, district heat, etc. The supply side has a natural vested interest in inefficiency by the end-users, in order to keep sales high and hence utilizing depletable resources as a means for making these supply investments profitable. It is the task of politicians to weigh the environmental and market considerations. But it is the responsibility of planners to present options which take their starting points from the needs of the people rather than from the needs of the market economy.
So much about the supply side and its strong impacts on energy savings. The supply side furthermore benefits from technologies consisting of efficiencies which can be quantified, and since the output and input are in similar energy flow units, their efficiencies can even be given in dimensionless numbers, like the above percentages.
End-use efficiencies
After demand side management came into energy modelling and energy policy, its focus has been on the efficiency of energy end-use, that is the system of technology which converts the secondary or useful energy into energy services, as shown in Figure 1 . The end-use efficiency is defined as the ratio of energy service output to the input of secondary energy (or useful energy or energywares). Problems around end-use efficiency and hence around demand side management, are centred on the energy service concept to be discussed in the following section.
Energy service
Attempts have been made to define a theoretical minimum energy consumption necessary for providing a certain energy service, terming this as the tertiary energy consumption. This, however, seems too limiting for illustrating the saving options, since some energy services in theory as well as in practice can be provided with zero energy input. This is for instance the case for keeping a comfortable indoor temperature in a cold climate, or for drying clothes. In other cases it is not possible to define a minimum energy input. In all cases, such a theoretical parameter makes little sense to decision makers and to people in general. We must accept some haze around energy services, in the sense that they are usually not measured in the same units and that there is no one unambiguous definition of them.
When recording energy services they can be divided into four types, namely: In this paper we suggest that the energy service concept refers only to the outputs from the end-use technologies that can be measured in physical units, but only in a few cases could this be energy units. In cases where a market value can be ascribed to the physical energy services they can be measured in monetary units, too. The monetary values can be used when adding up various energy services, as discussed in the following section, but usually the physical units are more illustrative and more relevant, when advocating higher end-use efficiencies. The non-quantifiable output is here defined as part of a general welfare, and not as an energy service.
As an example, let us assume in Figure 1 that electricity is end-used to pump water for a shower. The output from the shower could be measured in energy units by adding the potential and kinetic energy of the water flowing from the shower, but a more relevant indicator would be the physical units of litres of water delivered from the shower, or maybe by the washing effect provided if a physical indicator can describe that. The cost of providing the shower can be expressed in monetary terms as the expenses for supplying the water for the shower. If we go further, the pleasure of that shower is a nonquantifiable element of welfare, and as such we do not term it an energy service here. Since a shower will usually be with warm water, a full analysis of its energy implications should include a parallel chain for the necessary heat.
A quantification of energy services will usually come out in a great variety of units, such as kg clean clothes, m 2 floor space with a comfortable climate, hours of TV watching, etc. Each of them is rather precise in expressing the physical output from the end-use of energy, and time series can illustrate very well the development in the consumption of these energy services as well as in the end-use efficiencies. The development of each service can be illustrated by an energy service index, based on the situation in a base year.
The problem of quantifying energy services arises when we want to add them all up to one indicator for an entire sector, country or region, since each service is measured in different units.
Monetary weighing
One way to overcome the problem about adding the energy services for households, is simply to use the monetary income spent on each of the energy services as an indicator for weighing them. In monetary units the total energy service can then be found by just adding the single elements. If we want also to include as energy services the goods and services purchased with their indirect or embodied energy, then total spending is essentially an expression of the total energy service of, for instance, a household, since almost all consumption has a direct or indirect energy content.
Along the same path of monetary weighing, a nation's Gross Domestic Product, GDP, is often used by politicians as well as many modellers as an indicator of the country's total energy services. A nation's energy efficiency is then expressed by the ratio of GDP to total energy consumption, or more commonly, the reciprocal energy intensity. Both the income spent and the GDP are indicators of the activities within the monetary economy, and could be considered relevant for describing the energy service as defined here as only the physical output from end-use of energy. But often incomes and GDP are understood as indicators of general welfare, although it is well known that they are totally inadequate to describe this, as discussed later.
A drawback of weighing energy services according to their monetary values is also that when a service is provided by a more efficient end-use technology it will immediately count less in the weighing, although its users value is the same.
Frozen efficiency
Another way to add all the energy services more directly into one indicator is to weigh the single services according to their energy consumption in a base year. This methodology, termed 'frozen efficiency' has been used in a number of studies [11, 12] . With this weighing, the easy way to calculate the development in total energy services in a scenario is simply to run one calculation with the fictive assumption that end-use efficiencies has not changed at all -were frozen at the base-year level. The fictive development in energy consumption, measured in for instance fictive kWh/years, is used as an indicator of energy service development. For each single energy service, this fictive energy consumption can be compared and added, and the total energy service consumption be expressed by a unit of fictive energy equivalent units like 'kWh eq ' or 'kJ eq '. This service development can of course also be expressed by an index.
Problems with the frozen efficiency weighing of energy services are related to the fact that the method cannot reflect changes in people's preferences over time.
Lifestyle efficiencies
It might seem somewhat misplaced to talk about efficiency of the way we live, here denoted lifestyle, which expresses the total set of our behavioural patterns. Nevertheless, there are strong indications that it is both necessary, possible, and even desirable to adapt the way we live to provide welfare with less input of energy services. Necessary, in order to save energy and in other ways approach environmental sustainability. Desirable, because it could most likely provide a better life, physically as well as psychologically, for everybody. The fact that it is possible to adapt to a different lifestyle is demonstrated abundantly, for instance by the examples below. Lifestyle efficiency should be interpreted here in the very broad sense of the word as the ratio of welfare or well-being to the energy services consumed, see Figure 1 .
The content of welfare can be divided up into:
1 satisfying basic human needs, which are universally shared by all humans, and 2 satisfying the desires arising from cultural values, which are very diverse.
In short, the cultural specific values determine the means chosen to satisfy universal needs. Depending on which culture you belong to or subscribe to, you can, for instance, satisfy the same universal need for security by personally accumulating material wealth, by being on friendly terms with neighbours, or by supporting a society which grants you social security.
Constraints for lifestyles
Lifestyle as a system to provide welfare is not only determined by people's needs and values. It is constrained by the frames provided by nature's physical environment and by the social structure people have built around themselves. Only within these limitations can individuals realize their values in their lifestyle [2] . The options as well as the limitations of the social structure is, of course, also shaped by humans, through a political and economics process. The aim of human struggle up through history, and especially during industrialization, has been to reduce or eliminate the constraints from the natural environment. As an example, cultural values about hard work were established in the Western world over some centuries as a means of coping with severe environmental problems and to reach the present apparent success of controlling nature. Nature's constraints have to some extent been replaced by constraints from cultural values. Subsequently, however, these same values have in the highly industrialized part of the world outlived their original purpose of securing human existence. Today some of these values, as for instance the appreciation of work as a value in itself, expressed as a demand for more employment, might pose a threat to the sustainability of the natural environment, which on the other hand provides the foundation for the whole economy [13] .
Diversity of cultural values
Universal needs are shared by all people, but the means, including the lifestyles, chosen to satisfy these needs vary according to cultural values. Despite apparent increasing uniformity of lifestyles there are still significant variations in values and actually also in the way people live. Considering that the values of the coming generations are continuously being implanted by upbringing and education, it can be useful to demonstrate how open human nature is to value changes. A striking illustration of variations between cultural values is presented in a comparison between lifestyles in Norway and Japan [14] . The study shows that Japanese cultural traditions prompt them to use energy quite differently from the Norwegians, despite the similarities in the level of economic development in the two countries. For energy welfare, like keeping the body warm and cleaning clothes, the Japanese clearly have a more efficient lifestyle. When it comes to comforting the body with baths the Japanese have a preference for hot tub baths after a short shower. But since the tub bath is shared by all members of the family, one by one, energy consumption might not exceed that of the Norwegian habit of longer showers for each person. In general, traditions of resource efficiency prevail when it comes to Japanese lifestyles as compared to those of Europe and the USA. Consumption in general is modest relative to production, which has given modern Japan a record trade surplus.
The above example illustrates cultural variations between countries and cultures with rather similar economic and material wealth. If we turn to what is termed developing countries we can find cultural values which deviate significantly from those in industrialized countries, but satisfy people's needs very well. In some cases they even have life expectancies similar to those in industrialized parts of the world. Such high welfare levels are often maintained by lifestyles and economies which are environmentally sustainable or close to it. In industrialized countries we cannot just adapt such lifestyles, but we could get inspiration from the values underlying such lifestyles.
Within highly industrialized and highly consuming countries, small societies or communities still exist with a deviating pattern of behaviour, based on maintaining old cultural values. The Amish people in the USA is one example of a low consuming community within the most affluent nation in the world.
In Scandinavia, variation in lifestyles within countries has been found to have a significant impact on the consumption of energy and other resources. In similar physical frames like house size and type, family size, etc. energy consumption is found to vary by a factor of three [15] 
Energy savings by lifestyle changes
The above examples of variations in values are usually not motivated by the more recent concern for energy and environmental problems. With those constraints in mind, it is no doubt possible to improve lifestyle efficiencies by a factor of three in highly industrialized countries. Especially for the long-term future development in energy consumption the choices of lifestyles are decisive, and should be integrated in the planning process as part of the demand side management. Now and then the question is brought up as to whether it is ethically permissable to plan for, and to influence the value systems of future generations. The answer is that we cannot avoid the implementation of social values, so the question is rather in which direction these values should point. Today values are increasingly shaped by market forces with little concern for the environmental consequences. Hence, in modelling the future it seems highly appropriate to anticipate a society through democratic processes also to have a say in shaping values through education, etc.
The diversity in cultural values is endangered by global economy, but preserving it can be essential as a value pool of inspiration for necessary changes in values and in targets in general.
Pitfalls of sub-optimizing
In daily energy analyses and policy it is not realistic always to include all the links of the energy chain, Figure 1 . But the full model can help to avoid some pitfalls which planners presently are about to fall into, in global and national energy modelling, as well as in other environmental modelling. The pitfalls are hidden in the mist of optimization, which should imply getting the most out of a final resource, for instance money resource. Without pretending that we can achieve perfect optimization in systems as complex as the energy-environmental-economic systems, it is worthwhile to take a closer look at optimization of energy systems, since this concept forms an underlying guideline for an overall energy modelling and energy policy
Traditional supply oriented planning
Originally the reason for introducing demand side management was the fact that the energy chain was sub-optimized. Before the 1970s only the links from the bottom up to secondary energy in Figure 1 were included in the optimization by planners in an attempt to provide energy at the lowest possible price. This is the normal behaviour of a business trying to make a profit and it is increasingly dominating the whole energy sector. Basically such business will, as mentioned earlier, quite naturally see an interest in the highest possible efficiency below the line of secondary energy in Figure 1 and lowest possible efficiency above this line.
Integrated resource planning is an attempt to overcome such obvious suboptimization problems by at least including energy services in the optimization. But the problems of sub-optimization reaches deeper, as examples will show in the following.
Economy of scale efficiencies in end-uses
Improvement in the technological efficiencies of energy end-uses constitutes one of the most important elements in a development towards environmental sustainability. Nevertheless, optimizing this system of technologies constitutes a sub-optimization only, since the whole system stretches both up and down from end-use in Figure 1 .
Economy of scale effects imply in many end-uses an efficiency paradox. Everything else being equal, keeping a comfortable indoor climate for a family in a large house will consume less energy per unit of floor space than having the same family under the same conditions living in a smaller house. Part of the reason is simply that the ratio of the heatlosing surface to useful floor space is lower for a larger house than for a smaller one. Hence, normal indicators will denote the larger house to be more energy efficient, since it provides more energy service, floor space, per unit of annual energy input. The smaller house might very well save energy as compared to the larger, but it is less efficient.
Similar economy of scale effects apply to refrigerators and freezers, where one way to improve efficiency in terms of units of cooled storage volume per unit of annual energy consumption is to buy a bigger model, which might consume more electricity, but be more efficient.
Driving longer distances will normally also result in an improved efficiency performance of a vehicle, -and a larger energy consumption. Replacing a lamp by a similar one with larger wattage provides more light and consumes more electricity, but will usually result in better efficiency in terms of lumens per watt. Motors, pumps, ventilation, and other end-use technologies usually provide energy services more efficiently in large sizes than in small sizes.
To conclude, it is possible and quite common to improve end-use efficiencies by means which increase energy consumption. In general, the higher consumption of energy services in a society, the more efficient is the end-use technology.
Diminishing return in welfare
These technical examples above illustrate ways to improve an intermediate efficiency, that of the end-use technology, while at the same time reducing the efficiency of the next link, lifestyles. The latter is usually the case because an increase in energy service as suggested here for floor space, refrigerator volume available, distance travelled, etc. will normally have a diminishing return, marginally as well as on average, in the sense that it will not increase welfare proportionally. Hence lifestyle efficiency will decline. Such an increased efficiency in one link of the energy chain at the cost of efficiency in the following link is not a bad choice if the decrease is smaller than the increase. In mathematical terms the optimum for the two systems together is at the development level where the marginal decline in lifestyle efficiency equals the marginal increase in efficiency of the end-use technology. But it is hard to tell where this level is, because the efficiency of lifestyles cannot be quantified and directly compared to that of end-use. Due to just these quantification problems, there is a trend among decision makers to assume that quantifiable improvements are winning over non-quantifiable declines in lifestyle efficiency, resulting in an improved overall efficiency. However, the higher the material standard of living is, measured in, for instance, energy service level, the more likely it is that the end-use efficiency gained by economy of scale effects will result in a decline in overall efficiency. It is important to keep in mind here, that there are many other ways to increase end-use efficiencies, which are not dependent on the economy of scale effect, and they will not directly affect the efficiencies in lifestyles.
One way to make good use of the economy of scale effect for achieving a higher overall efficiency is by better utilizing the larger end-use technologies, for instance by sharing them. Increasing household sizes, pooling cars, living in an apartment building, or sharing a freezer with neighbours are examples. In the manufacturing sectors, there is a sincere effort to utilize the economy of scale effect by merging production, etc. But in affluent societies the trend of values in the private sector has been in the opposite direction. Individual freedom has been the market's main argument for not sharing.
National economy and lifestyle efficiency
As mentioned earlier, the overall energy service for a nation or a region is often described by the Gross Domestic Product, GDP. The end-use efficiency indicator will then be the GDP to energy consumption ratio or more often expressed by the reciprocal indicator, the energy intensity.
Without any special environmental effort, the end-use efficiency of a growing economy will for three reasons automatically tend to increase:
Firstly, an economy of scale effect, similar to that of the single end-use technologies, will also tend automatically to increase energy end-use efficiency through mass production, etc.
Secondly, as the economy grows, its structure changes, due to shifts towards satisfying other elements of human need. At the European high level of economic development, the structural trend is moving towards lower energy intensities, in which the energy-heavy sectors like production of steel, cement, and other building materials play a declining role in the total economy [5] . Industry is increasingly being dominated by manufacturing more energy-light goods such as electronics. At the same time also various forms of service activities are taking over an increasing share of the GDP. The structural change effect is automatically improving end-use efficiency of the economy.
Thirdly, in a growing economy, the capital replacement rate is higher than in an economy with no growth. The result is that the capital replacement effect will make it possible to introduce more energy efficient end-use technology faster in all sectors of the economy.
All three tendencies are somewhat modified in real life. The economy of scale effect is counteracted by more energy spent on transmitting and transporting goods, and simply by often going beyond the optimum for various reasons. The structural effect is modified by the fact that the differences in energy intensities of the various sectors are very modest, when taking into account the interactions between the sectors by use of inputoutput tables as shown by Jespersen [16] . The capital replacement effect is counteracted by a reduced interest in energy expenses when production and sales are growing.
The most severe problem is, however, that all the above efficiency gains are dependent on a growth in general consumption. This will inevitably result in a decline of lifestyle efficiency, which sooner or later outbalances the end-use efficiency gains from the above, resulting in a decline in overall efficiency.
To summarize, for highly industrialized regions like Europe, Japan, or North America, the above-mentioned gains in energy efficiency in the economy, for instance expressed by declining energy intensities, is nothing to be proud of since it is obtained more or less automatically without any special efforts. More important, these efficiency gains will often be outbalanced by growth in the economy, all resulting in an increase in energy consumption and a decline in overall efficiency. The full benefit of end-use efficiency gains can be gathered by dedicated efforts towards gains beyond what is automatically derived from economic growth, and at the same time preventing the associated deterioration of lifestyle efficiency.
The inadequacy of the high GDP to promote efficient lifestyles can be read from analyses revealing how badly GDP reflects the welfare of people [17, 18] . Such studies show that real economic welfare in wealthy countries has been declining for decades, during which GDP has grown. Surveys in wealthy countries also indicate a public preference which is quite different from just higher incomes, consumption and other GDP related parameters [13] .
In poor developing countries with most of the economy informal, GDP is obviously also a poor indicator of welfare. Consequently, in energy modelling and planning, it is misleading still to use the GDP as an indicator of progress.
Energy planning versus market economy
Planning will always form a contrast to a market economy with its laissez-faire way of thinking. Despite the generally accepted advantages of a market mechanism for allocating resources, it is also generally recognized by economists that regulation of the market is necessary for social and environmental reasons. The argument is that collective considerations like the necessity to deal with social and environmental issues cannot automatically be picked up by the market economy without government intervention. Therefore, one of the greatest tasks in government planning and policies is to establish socially acceptable and environmentally sustainable frameworks within which the market can operate freely. The question is not whether to intervene in the market economy, but rather how and how much.
Early interventions in the energy market
Before the 1973 oil shock and the early years to follow, energy planning was limited to activities by the electricity sector and other energy suppliers. Planning was characterized here by a remarkable lack of interest in the demand side. From those years, Figure 2 shows some examples of the electricity demand prognoses for Denmark, suggested mainly by electric utilities and by the government [19] . They are here compared to the actual development in consumption [20] which today is only one third of what one of the prognoses suggested. In those prognoses the demand side was not even analysed, which could have revealed the difficulties in spending such amounts of electricity. The main methods used for these prognoses were just mathematical trend extrapolations, and they formed the basis for planning future capacity needs.
The oil shock in 1973 triggered the idea of government planning crossing the borderline of secondary energy in Figure 1 , and moving into the promised land of energy savings. It was suddenly recognized that the world was facing severe collective problems related to resources, environment and security of supply, and that the market was not able to solve them. It was recognized to be the responsibility of governments to intervene in the way people spend their money on energy. Still, for several years however, energy planning remained synonymous with energy supply planning, and to many people in the energy sector this is still perceived as the 'real' energy planning.
The first interventions in people's free market choices have been in the energy efficiency of end-use technology. But once in a while top politicians in the Scandinavian countries have also voiced the necessity for people to adapt their lifestyles to be more in harmony with an environmentally sustainable development. Usually the politicians do not specify this very well, probably because they realize that we are facing here one of the most severe clashes between environmental sustainability planning and a free market economy. Most dedicated efforts to adapt lifestyles towards saving energy, will also save consumption and production in general and hence tend to reduce GDP, which today would still be contrary to the interests of most top politicians.
In the recent one or two decades the world has experienced a polarization between an increasing drive for an internationally freer market economy and a simultaneous increase in consciousness about the environmental necessity to intervene by regulating the market. In the energy sector, modelling and planning have moved still higher up in the chain, Figure 1 , towards demand side management. But when it comes to political actions, at present there is a tendency to pull back and give top priority to the free market.
Integrated resource planning
Once in a while a new concept emerges on the environmental scene. Integrated Resource Planning, IRP, is one such concept that makes good sense in energy planning to capture the full picture of the way we use our resources.
Very briefly, the main purpose of IRP is to obtain the optimal overall efficiency of the energy chain as discussed in the previous section. Usually IRP is interpreted as planning for optimizing the process of providing certain energy services at the lowest possible cost in the broad sense of the word, see Figure 1 , forgetting for the moment the further links with lifestyle efficiency. One way to include the environmental cost is to assume a politically established environmental target, after which the optimization can be defined as reaching these environmental targets with the lowest possible monetary cost. This approach is often applied to carbon dioxide emission, for which specific targets are negotiated internationally. Another way is to estimate the monetary costs of the environmental damage and internalize these externalities into the conventional economic optimizations.
IRP in a liberal energy market
In the 1970s and 1980s, when energy savings became an element in energy policy, governments were amazingly fast to leave the responsibility for energy savings programs to the suppliers. This was especially the case where suppliers had a monopoly as in the cases of electricity, gas and district heat. In these cases the suppliers were typically subjected to price control as well as to some public service obligations, whether the utilities were privately owned or public. In recent years the utilities in many countries have been requested to carry out Integrated Resource Planning as a public service obligation. The purpose is to ensure that new investments are made in the links in the energy chain that give most benefit for money, for instance in efficiency improvements in the demand side. Implementing Integrated Resource Planning has been faced with many problems, and in general energy savings carried out through the suppliers have been a limited success. And this way of implementing savings through the supplier is not going to be easier in the future.
Most countries in the world are now opening the supply of energy to an international liberal market. The consequence of that will be the necessity for each supplier to compete on the international market. Businesses can usually compete on three factors: quality, service, and price.
The quality of energy can be a stable supply of a uniform product, and probably also the 'environmental cleanness' of the electricity, gas or district heat in terms of its environmental origin. It is likely that customers will be increasingly willing to pay more for electricity made from environmentally friendly sources than for what is generated from coal or nuclear fuel. Such marketing of 'green' electricity has already been introduced.
As mentioned, some governments have required utilities to promote energy savings to their customers as a service. It seems unreasonable, however, to demand a supplier to work wholeheartedly to sell less. If the energy markets are liberated, allowing a supplier at one end of Europe to sell energy to a customer at the other end, such public service obligation cannot be taken seriously. The policy used in California, where the government encouraged utilities to promote energy saving by rewarding them according to how much they saved, is not likely to work either in a competitive market [21] . The reward took the form of permission to charge higher prices for the remaining consumption, but in a free market there will be no such price control and hence no way to reward through such permission. Another basic problem with rewarding or requiring energy savings lies in estimating how much has been saved at the end of the year, since it is difficult to tell how high the consumption would have been otherwise. It is quite easy to measure how much has been produced from biomass, wind power and other environmentally benign sources. But to work out how much has been saved is difficult and uncertain. This constitutes a fundamental difference between policies to promote cleaner energy sources and those to promote energy savings.
In the liberal market, international competition on a rather uniform commodity such as electricity and gas will be mainly on prices for these secondary forms of energy. The suppliers will have to concentrate on optimizing their investments and efforts towards obtaining the lowest possible cost per kWh electricity or m 3 of gas. This is directly in conflict with IRP, which requires an optimization towards the lowest cost for providing the energy service wanted. It is not possible to operate the full system from primary energy to energy service optimally, and at the same time operate part of the system optimally, namely that from primary energy to secondary energy. According to this fundamental rule about sub-optimizing discussed earlier in the paper, suppliers are forced to ignore the end-use efficiency options and hence drop the IRP concept almost before it has been implemented. Utilities are beginning to claim that the time of IRP is over, just because they realize that their time in IRP is over.
Integrated Resource Planning is needed more than ever, but it is an obvious task for a government body, which should have no vested interest in supply of gas, electricity or other forms of energy. Also, only governments hold the keys to future policies in all the fields associated with energy planning, as discussed in the next section. 
Modelling process of demand scenarios
Earlier, prognoses for future energy demand, as seen in Figure 2 , were the basic input to the planning of future supply systems, and before 1973 this was about the only energy planning. Prognoses are attempts to forecast future developments in exogenous parameters to the planning models, which at that time included supply systems only. The simple mathematical extrapolation behind the prognoses in Figure 2 demonstrates the need to include at least some of the demand side system in the models. On the other hand, attempts to create totally endogenous models, in which demand for energy is generated internally, seem too mechanistic and unsuited for democratic decision-making. As a basis for public debate the exogenous input to the models should consist of scenarios for some key parameters which are open to political changes. Hence they should not be presented as final prognoses, but rather as flexible scenario parameters which in the model can be adjusted to demonstrate political actions.
Final prognoses for demand as the foundation for making energy supply decisions presume availability of unlimited energy supply. Prognoses are insufficient when a change in course is necessary. With resource and pollution constraints on the supply, a scenario planning process seems more appropriate. Figure 3 The process of planning environmentally sustainable energy consumption futures is an iterative process of creating scenarios and adjusting the determining factors like population, technology, and economy or lifestyles. Figure 3 illustrates a process of modelling and planning, simplified to include all exogenous developments in three main categories of determinants:
Iterative scenario modelling process
1 Population, P, 2 Economy and lifestyles, expressed by the energy service per capita, S, and 3 Technology, expressed by the end-use efficiency or rather the energy intensity, I [22] .
The process begins with reasonable assumptions for these three factors for each end-use of energy. On this basis a scenario is created for development in future total energy demand by summing up the end-uses. If the three determinants have the form of indices, relative to base year value, the index for future energy consumption is in principle given by: E = P * S * I
The environmental consequences of this scenario will depend on the size of the demand, E, as well as on the supply options chosen. The latter, supply choices, are here deliberately understated, partly to focus on the demand side, but also to stress that essentially all supplies have environmental impacts. Having analysed and calculated the environmental consequences of the scenario, they are compared to the criteria for environmental sustainability, expressed by the maximum permissible environmental impact. If the consequences of the scenario exceed the permissible impact, for instance a CO 2 -emission target, adjustments have to be made in the three determinants. Improvement in the end-use technology has usually been the first choice (next to changes in the supplies) in energy planning. Taking a long-term perspective, however, a look at the other two factors, population and economy, seems highly relevant.
After the adjustments, a new scenario is built, and the iterative process goes on until at least one and preferably more environmentally sustainable scenarios can be presented for open political debate.
The three variable parameters
Usually development in population is not considered part of an energy model, except maybe as a final prognosis. Without going into details, it should be stressed that since globally the development in population is a major concern from an environmental point of view, it ought also to be considered a variable in national environmental policy, including energy policy. Only a few countries like Indonesia and China have associated environmental policy with population policy. If future supply of energy should come from the rather space-demanding renewable sources, population densities can be a decisive factor in energy planning. Consequently, population policy is not only a concern of the developing countries, but ought also to have more attention in some of the most densely populated areas like Europe and Japan. Since in those regions, energy consumption per capita is also high, the results are very high-energy consumption densities, that is consumption per km 2 land area. Development in technology here refers to the development in end-use efficiency, which has already been discussed earlier in the paper.
Also the economic development has been extensively discussed earlier. So far the growth in economic activities has been taken seriously in energy policy only as a final prognosis input, not as a policy variable. Despite ceremonious statements about giving a higher priority to environment than to economy, political action still reveals the opposite priority.
As the equation of E = P * S * I suggests, any progress towards lowering energy consumption by reducing the intensity, I, will be eaten up by a continuous growth in population and economy. It is important to include these two important factors in any energy demand modelling to stress their importance on line with the technological enduse efficiency gains. The equation also stresses that energy consumption is never, as often claimed, decoupled from economic development. The demand model principle described here has been applied to Scandinavia and to Europe [11, 23] .
Concluding remarks and summary
Since the oil crisis in 1973, energy planning has gradually come to include not only the supply side of the system, but also the demand side due to increasing awareness of the severe environmental problems we could otherwise be facing. This demand side planning has been a challenge to the free market philosophy which has gained momentum over the same period, and the battle between the environmental need for more regulation is clashing with the economic expansion drive for less regulation. In the present situation it seems necessary to prepare for more environmental regulation of the market, meaning pushing the boundary between planning and free market upwards in Figure 1 .
Decisions will be made through the political processes, but energy modellers should lay open the conflict between planning and free market, and as far as possible point out the consequences and the risks from both sides. In illustrative energy models the nonquantifiable aspects can very well be outlined along with the quantifiable aspects.
It is essential that energy modellers aiming for sustainable development pay more attention to the new trends in economics with similar aims for sustainability [24] . In this way the models can illuminate the options for really coherent sustainable options. Steps are taken in that direction by for instance Peet [25] , but too much energy modelling is carried out as isolated exercises, yet not integrated with the appropriate models in economics and other aspect of societies.
Main flaws in energy modelling
The following list suggests what has gone wrong during the past 25 years of modelling saving potentials, as well as what is still going in the wrong direction. in modelling the energy consumption pattern of societies, despite the fact that this can have a very important impact on future energy demand.
6 The Gross Domestic Product has been used uncritically as an indicator of progress and welfare, assuming its growth to be the highest target. Other indicators are beginning to show up.
7 From the beginning Integrated Resource Planning as well as energy saving activities have often been turned over to energy suppliers, rather than being a task of a neutral government body. This mistake will become even more obvious if the energy markets are liberalized.
Visions of the future
In principle human rights ought to include equal quotas to all people to pollute the environment and to utilize the resources of the earth. As far as CO 2 -emission is concerned the maximum permissible quota per person would be around one tenth of what a typical European accounts for at present, according to the suggestions by the Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change [26] . It is reassuring that such an environmental target seems to be within reach, while still providing each person with a life of dignity and joy.
Often the environmental problems about non-renewable energy resources and pollution are presented as if some sharp thresholds could be defined. This is normally not the case. In real life the environmental damages and risks are increasing gradually, the more pressure we put on the environment. And of course the other way around, the more we protect the environment and keep margins to any absolute thresholds, the better environmental qualities we shall be able to enjoy. The benefits of increasing the energy service level should always be compared to the associated decline in environmental quality of life.
Looking back at Figure 1 about ends and means, we have discussed how we could improve overall efficiency, defined as the ratio of ultimate end to ultimate means. If, however, we can satisfy human demands for welfare well, (meet the ultimate end at top of Figure 1 ), while still keeping a wide margin to any environmental sustainability limits (the means in the bottom of Figure 1 ), then we actually do not have to worry about efficiency. Those are the conditions under which mankind has lived most of its time on the earth.
